IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS. CRIMINAL NO. 1:22CR58-LG-BWR-1

PATRICK DARNELL DANIELS, JR.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

BEFORE THE HONORABLE LOUIS GUIROLA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

JULY 6, 2022 GULFPORT, MISSISSIPPI

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT:

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FOR THE DEFENDANT:

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1 THE COURT: Madam clerk, will you please call the 2 first case. The United States District Court for the 3 THE CLERK: 4 Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division, Criminal Case No. 1:22cr58, United States of America versus Patrick 5 6 Darnell Daniels, Jr. set for a motion hearing. 7 **THE COURT:** What says the government? MR. BUCKNER: Jonathan Buckner on behalf of the 8 9 government, Your Honor. And at counsel's table, I also have 10 with me Ray Bell, the case agent, and the government is ready 11 to proceed. 12 **THE COURT:** Good afternoon, gentlemen. What says the 13 defendant? MR. WEBER: Ready, Your Honor. Good afternoon. 14 John Weber on behalf of Mr. Daniels. 15 16 THE COURT: Mr. Weber, good day to you as well. 17 The matter is scheduled for a motion hearing, but we are 18 also going to incorporate the pretrial conference as well. 19 That, of course, assumes the Court's ruling on the pending 20 motion to dismiss the indictment. 21 All right. Mr. Weber, I have read the defendant's motion, as well as the memorandum brief in support of a motion to 22 23 dismiss the indictment. Are you ready to proceed on your motion? 24 25 MR. WEBER: Yes, Your Honor. We also filed late

yesterday a reply and response to the government's.

THE COURT: I have all of those documents. I have read them. I'm going to give you an opportunity to argue it, since this is a question that hinges on the constitutionality of the statute. I'm going to give you an opportunity to make some argument, and I will give Mr. Buckner an opportunity to make some argument before the Court rules on it.

MR. WEBER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Buckner, I also have your materials.

Are you ready to proceed as well?

MR. BUCKNER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Apparently, since the very recent Supreme Court decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association versus Bruen, there may be some question -- at least that is the question that arises from the defendant in this case as to whether or not Section 922(g) of Title 18 of the United States Code, that is, (g)(3), whether or not that statute meets constitutional muster. I will give each side ten minutes within which to argue the motion. Mr. Weber, you can reserve part of your argument in rebuttal if you wish to do so. You may proceed.

MR. WEBER: Yes, Your Honor.

Your Honor, we did file this motion to dismiss pursuant to the most recent Supreme Court case of *Bruen*. In *Bruen*, what the Supreme Court did was say, look, since a case called

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Heller, the Courts of Appeals has used this two-step analysis. One was whether or not a regulation, specifically a gun regulation, impinges on an individual's Second Amendment right to possess or bear arms. And if it does, the second part of that analysis is to apply what's considered an intermediate scrutiny of that particular law in that it's narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.

What the Supreme Court did recently in Bruen, they said, that's not the standard to apply. What the courts are to do is when the plain text of the Second Amendment covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The Second Amendment presumptively protects an individual's right to bear arrangements, that is, an individual's right to self-defense and personal protection. When that occurs, according to Bruen, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the national historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this nation's historical tradition may a Court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's unqualified command. government must affirmatively prove that its firearm regulation in part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear firearms. And what Bruen did was abrogate a Fifth Circuit precedent, that's National Rifle Association of America, Incorporated versus the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives.

Very quickly, that case was about someone under the age of 21's right to possess and bear arms. And in that case, the Fifth Circuit did use the intermediate scrutiny analysis.

In this case, in looking at the government's response, the government has not provided this Court a basis for the law rooted in history. They haven't done that. The government has not put forth any evidence or any argument that this particular law is rooted in the nation's historical tradition of firearms regulation.

That's our point. This is not a question, Your Honor, of whether or not this gun law is a good idea. When we start talking about whether or not this gun law is a good idea, we start moving into this intermediate scrutiny analysis, again, whether or not it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.

And finally, Your Honor, I know my time is limited, but the government may bring up a phrase used in *Bruen*, quote, law-abiding citizen. Well, I point out to the Court that in Justice Alito and Justice Cavanaugh's concurring opinion, they said, look, this opinion does not address, quote, the categories of people who may lawfully possess a firearm. This case is about applying the correct scrutiny -- or this argument, this motion, is about applying the correct analysis of this particular law and whether or not it -- whether or not

1 the impingement on the individual's Second Amendment right is 2 rooted in our nation's history. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Weber. I will hear from 3 4 the government, Mr. Buckner. 5 MR. BUCKNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 6 Before I begin, I have provided a copy of this to counsel 7 opposite. The government has prepared a one-page bullet point 8 document with some case law and some bullet points concerning 9 that that the government would like to submit at this time, if the Court would receive it. 10 11 **THE COURT:** You can give it to my law clerk. 12 MR. BUCKNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 May I proceed, Your Honor? 14 **THE COURT:** Yes, please. 15 MR. BUCKNER: May it please the Court, the first 16 issue the Court has to determine before reaching whether or not 17 the nation's tradition of qun regulation is analogous to the 18 922(q)(3) prohibition of a firearm -- possession of a firearm 19 by an unlawful user of a controlled substance is to determine 20 whether or not that Second Amendment right would apply to 21 someone who is not a law-abiding or responsible citizen. In Bruen, the majority opinion referenced the Second 22 23 Amendment protecting law-abiding or responsible citizens' rights to possess firearms 11 times. In fact, the Court 24

prefaced much of its ruling on the fact that Cook and Nash were

two ordinary law-abiding adult citizens, thus part of the people referenced by the Second Amendment.

So the Second Amendment doesn't protect all people's right to possess firearms. In fact, from Heller, McDonald through Bruen, the Supreme Court has been clear, it protects law-abiding citizens' rights to possess firearms. The Court explicitly stated in Bruen that today's decision holds the state may not enforce the law like New York Sullivan law that effectively prevents its law-abiding citizens from carrying a gun for this purpose. That is all we decide. Our holding decides nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm or the requirements that must be met to buy a gun.

So when you look at *Bruen* and you look at the fact that the Second Amendment only protects law-abiding citizens' rights to possess firearms, it is clear this challenge to a 922(g)(3) charge must be dismissed. The 922(g)(3) charge at issue here charges the defendant with being an unlawful user of a controlled substance. The Court has got to take that fact as true at this point in time. That means he is not a law-abiding citizen. And the Court need not reach whether regulating the possession of firearms by people like the defendant in this case is consistent with this nation's tradition.

Because Bruen didn't decide who may lawfully possess a firearm, the Fifth Circuit's prior decisions referenced in the government's response and in the one-page document just

provided are binding precedent on this Court. And those cases all conclude that a 922(g)(3) charge passes constitutional muster.

Now, assuming the Court disagrees and determines that there does need to be some historical basis for regulating the possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, the motion to dismiss still fails. What the Supreme Court said in Bruen is that the Court needs to look to historical analogues. And what type of analogue is required? Well, Bruen, again, gives guidance. They say, to be clear, even if a modern day regulation is not a dead ringer for a historical precursor, it still must be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster. For example, Courts can use analogies to long-standing laws forbidding carrying of firearms in sensitive places, such as schools and government buildings, to determine whether modern regulations are constitutionally permissible.

Well, with that in mind for what an analogue is, there is clear historical precedent for the regulation of firearms based on the risk that the possessor of that firearm imposes. In Bruen itself, there is some discussion of that. In Bruen, the Court references general V.E. Sickles 1866 decree that promoted the right of well-disposed inhabitants to bear arms, but it excluded, expressly excluded disorderly persons, vagrants or disturbers of the peace. So that's a historical tradition of

prohibiting people from possessing firearms based on the risk that they pose.

In State versus Shelby, found at 90 MO 302, it's an 1886 case from Missouri, the Court there upheld a law prohibiting intoxicated persons from carrying firearms.

So initially, the Court doesn't need to get to the history of it because the defendant in this case is not a law-abiding citizen. Taking the indictment that he is an unlawful user of a controlled substance, the Court need not reach that issue. But if it does, within Bruen, within Heller, within McDonald, it is clear that this nation has a tradition of prohibiting people who pose risk to the community at large from possessing firearms, and the analogy between someone who is mentally impaired and a felon and someone who is an unlawful user of a controlled substance is sufficient to deny the motion to dismiss, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Buckner. Mr. Weber, do you wish to reply?

MR. WEBER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well. Thank you, gentlemen.

All right. Again, the Court has reviewed the motion, as well as the memorandum that have been provided by counsel for the defendant, counsel for the government, and the reply brief as well. In the opinion of the Court, there are sufficient case authority to conclude that the motion to dismiss should be

1 I find that the statute that is Section 922(q)(3) of denied. 2 Title 18 of the United States Code does pass constitutional 3 muster under the recent Bruen decision from the Supreme Court, 4 as well as other precedent within not only the Fifth Circuit but in other circuits as well. I will rule on that from the 5 6 bench. The motion is denied. However, in view of the fact 7 that this is, to my knowledge, the first challenge to Section 8 922(q)(3) of Title 18 of the United States Code, based upon a 9 constitutional analysis under *Bruen*, I will follow that up with a written order. 10 11 Anything else on behalf of the government insofar as this 12 motion is concerned? 13 MR. BUCKNER: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Weber, anything else on behalf of the 14 15 defendant? 16 MR. WEBER: No, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Very well. I will proceed now to the 18 pretrial conference aspect of our hearing this afternoon. Are 19 there any other motions that are pending on behalf of the 20 government? 21 MR. BUCKNER: No, Your Honor. **THE COURT:** Any other motions pending, Mr. Weber, on 22 behalf of the defendant? 23 MR. WEBER: No, Your Honor. 24

THE COURT: All right. I think I was previously

1 advised that this case would take two or three days to try. 2 Mr. Buckner, is that still accurate? MR. BUCKNER: Your Honor, I believe three days would 3 4 be accurate. It shouldn't be more than three days. 5 THE COURT: Is that your understanding as well, Mr. 6 Weber? 7 MR. WEBER: Yes, Your Honor. I will schedule this matter for jury 8 THE COURT: 9 selection and trial on July 25th, and I believe that falls on a Monday, Monday, July 25th, at 9:00 a.m. Let me point out to 10 11 all the parties that the jury selection process will consist of 12 the blind strike method. You are all familiar with that, Mr. 13 Buckner, Mr. Weber. Both of you have chosen juries in the past 14 based on the blind strike method. In addition to that, I'm going to ask that all 15 16 nondispositive motions -- I believe all the dates have run, if 17 I'm not mistaken, for motions, as well as plea negotiations, so 18 what I'm going to ask for then, let's see, I'm going to ask for jury instructions, witness lists, and exhibit lists. 19 20 will be due no later than July the 18th. That's July 18th for witness lists, exhibit lists, and jury instructions. Trial on 21 July 25th. 22 All right. Mr. Buckner, I presume that you have tendered 23 some plea offers to the defendant. Is that accurate? 24

MR. BUCKNER: Your Honor --

1 THE COURT: You don't have to tell me what they are. 2 I just want to be sure you have done it. 3 MR. BUCKNER: I am not aware as to whether or not a 4 formal offer has been made. Ms. Rose was assigned the case I believe -- I'm not sure, Your Honor. 5 prior to me. 6 **THE COURT:** Okay. There's no dishonor in saying you 7 don't know. MR. BUCKNER: Yes, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: Mr. Weber, let me ask you. Have you been provided with any plea offers on behalf of the government? 10 11 MR. WEBER: No, Your Honor. I think some of the 12 Assistant U.S. Attorney's practices, they don't offer a plea 13 unless the defense asks for one. MR. BUCKNER: Your Honor, may I speak with counsel 14 15 opposite briefly? 16 THE COURT: Sure. 17 MR. BUCKNER: Your Honor, I have been able to find --18 there was an offer, I believe, made in mid-June. 19 **THE COURT:** I'm sorry. I didn't understand what you 20 said. 21 There was a plea offer made in MR. BUCKNER: mid-June, Your Honor. 22 23 **THE COURT:** Is that correct, Mr. Weber? 24 MR. WEBER: Yes, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: I'm not simply idly curious. I want to

1	be sure the defendant has been provided if an offer was
2	made, it was provided to the defendant, he reviewed it and
3	considered it and rejected it. Is that correct?
4	MR. WEBER: Yes, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: That's all I needed to know.
6	All right, then. Anything else on behalf of the
7	government before we close this hearing?
8	MR. BUCKNER: No, Your Honor, nothing on behalf of
9	the government.
10	THE COURT: Mr. Weber, anything else on behalf of
11	your client, Mr. Daniels, before we close the hearing today?
12	MR. WEBER: No, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: Very well. Then I will see everyone on
14	the 25th of July for jury selection and trial. That will be
15	Mr. Daniels' next scheduled court appearance. If there is
16	nothing else, you may be excused.
17	The defendant is remanded back to the U.S. Marshals
18	pending trial. I don't think we have anything else this
19	afternoon, so we are adjourned.
20	(HEARING CONCLUDED)
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understanding.

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CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER

I, Teri B. Norton, RMR, FCRR, RDR, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the proceedings reported by me using the stenotype reporting method in conjunction with computer-aided transcription, and that same is a true and correct transcript to the best of my ability and

I further certify that the transcript fees and format comply with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference of the United States.

S/ Jeri B. Norton

TERI B. NORTON, RMR, FCRR, RDR

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